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The United States has done little to address the People’s Republic of 
China’s (PRC) massive foreign investment strategy known as the Belt and 
Road Initiative (BRI).  The PRC seeks to achieve domestic economic 
growth, strategic energy security, and influence within target countries 
through its BRI investments.  The BRI presents challenges to US foreign 
policy and national security objectives across the globe with the 
epicenter of effects within the Asia-Pacific region.  Recent research 
indicates that the PRC’s investment strategy may achieve mixed results, 
however.  I explore the greater body of literature on economic statecraft, 
coercion, and international political economy to place the PRC’s 
utilization of economic power in context.  I address under what 
conditions, or to what extent, PRC BRI investment will result in positive 
influence for the PRC in a recipient country.
A Game of Economic Power and Influence:  
The People’s Republic of China’s Belt and 
Road Initiative
Results and “So What”
I find that the PRC’s application of an economic interest 
transformation strategy based on positive economic 
incentives is more likely to achieve positive influence in 
a target state than a coercive economic strategy.  This 
presents opportunities for US policymakers and agencies 
within the US government that execute foreign policy in 
countries where competition against the PRC is present.  
It is also likely that the PRC may pursue an interest 
transformation strategy more often as a result of its 
growing economic power. This will necessitate novel 
approaches to increase US influence in target countries.
Research concerning the PRC’s use of BRI investments to achieve 
strategic outcomes is in its infancy.  Qualitative case study 
analysis of PRC attempts to achieve outcomes through BRI 
investments, as well as future quantitative study of the 
underlying variables that determine whether the PRC achieves 
positive outcomes, are both beneficial to understanding the 
problem.
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Research design
I analyze two case studies of PRC attempts to achieve 
influence through economic leverage in Taiwan. I then 
extrapolate those findings to provide insight into PRC 
attempts to achieve influence through BRI investments.  I 
use a two-player sequential bargaining game to analyze 
the PRC and Taiwan’s interaction in both cases.  I apply a 
process-tracing methodology within cases to infer a causal 
mechanism. A comparative case study analysis reveals a 
significant change in the PRC’s method of wielding 
economic power produces different outcomes between 
cases. 
Case 1: The Taishang Game, 2000–2004
The Economic Exit Cost Game (Crescenzi, 2005, p. 63)
Case 2: The Interest Transformation Game, 2005–2008
Future Research
